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Abstract
This study is going to investigate the problem of relativism in the writings of Karl Mannheim and
David Bloor. These two scholars are important confessors of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim
began to apply the notion of relationism instead of relativism. Some critics believed to understand this
object, others talked about the lack of real differences. My first aim is to differentiate these notions
and to provide acceptable reasons why Mannheim chose relationism. The second question I want
to answer is what David Bloor meant by relativism. Is he a traditional relativist, or does he use the
methodology of relationism though he is not explicit about it?
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‘so liegt die Wahrheit des Bewußtseins
darin, daß es niemals daneben greift...’
Karl Mannheim
1. Sketching the Problem
Debates on the problem of relativism have seriously strengthened with the appear-
ance of the sociology of knowledge at the end of 1920s. The discipline originated
from Karl Mannheim who kept escaping from different political regimes during all
his life. He may have been the first scholar of the 20th century who did not hesitate
to pose the question: why are we afraid of relativism so much when we had better
make it our best friend? But Mannheim did not stop at the point of facing relativism,
he went further and elaborated the concept of relationism. This latter one is still
seriously debated whether it is really something very different or not.
Since Mannheim pointed out the differences between relativism and rela-
tionism, this topic emerged in the after-war history of sociology. From the early
1970s, David Bloor, Barry Barnes and the other members of the Edinburgh School
refreshed both the classical sociology of knowledge and the problem of relativism.
They managed to widen the applicability of the discipline. In spite of Mannheim’s
disapproval of the sociological explanations for the exact sciences, David Bloor
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posed the question: Why not? Why should we exclude e.g. the mathematical
knowledge from the sociological investigations?
Both Mannheim and Bloor use the word ‘relativism’, but are they really talking
about the same notion? And what about Mannheim’s relationism? These are the
central questions I pursue answer in this study.
First, I evoke what Mannheim writes about classical relativism and then I
try to sum up what he means by relationism. It is not explicit but, I think, it can
be made explicit. Then, I hope I can point to the differences of the two concepts.
Second, I’m going to investigate David Bloor’s writings on relativism and I will
try to compare it with Mannheim’s terminology. My thesis is that Bloor gradually
became a relationist. Third, I want to see why David Bloor accepts a sort of realist
position today.
2. From Relativism to Relationism
Here I want to detail three types of relativism that are determined by the history
of philosophical thinking: ontological, semantic and epistemological relativism.1
Once we investigate the sociology of knowledge we need to consider only the latest
one. Epistemologists differentiate also three basic kinds in relativism: knowledge
relativism (KR for short), observational relativism (OR for short) and methodologi-
cal relativism (MR for short).2 Most of these values are accepted by the sociologists
of knowledge.
First, we need to present short definitions for these epistemological relativisms
in order to shed light on whether the mentioned sociologies of knowledge are
relativist or not, and if they are, then in what sense. KR means that ‘what is known
or believed is relative to a person, culture, framework or whatever’; OR ‘arises
naturally in certain views about the nature of perceptual reports’; MR ‘arises with
the claim that there is no theory of scientific method (or a methodology in any form
of inquiry), or there are no rules of reasoning, especially evidential rules, which can
be accorded a special or privileged status over and above any other method or set
of rules of reasoning.’3
We would also say for shorter that KR means that there is nothing like knowl-
edge, there are only beliefs about the world; OR means that there is incommen-
surability at the observational level and that all observations are theory laden; and
MR means that our rules of investigation can never be the only method. These are
rather naked definitions but still applicable for our purpose.
First Karl Mannheim referred to the importance of this relativist methodology
in the 20th century. So I would like to show the peculiarities of his theory in
1Robert NOLA (1988) pp. 1–35.
2Ibid.; I made these names of classification for short because R. N. only construed the categories.
Here I do not want to detail the definitions he made, it is out of the task of this study.
3Ibid.
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the following section. I would like to get to know why Mannheim has chosen
relationism instead of relativism and what he meant by that.
Two works are important in the present case: the Ideology and Utopia (Ideolo-
gie und Utopie, 1929) and the Sociology of Knowledge (Wissensoziologie, 1931).
These two writings were originally published at different times and places but
nowadays English and German publishers consequently attach the latter to the later
editions of Ideology and Utopia.4 It can be taken to be a well-founded decision be-
cause one can better understand the earlier book after reading the short, latter study.
So, I think it would be a needless effort to assess these two writings separately.
It seems to be a good way to understand Mannheim’s relativism, first of all,
to grasp the total conception of ideology. The total conception of ideology is ‘the
ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we
are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the
mind of this epoch or of this group’5. The main features of the total conception
of ideology are the following: first, it does not rely solely on ‘what is actually
said by the opponent in order to reach an understanding of his real meaning and
intention. …The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as functions of
his existence’; second, ‘the total conception calls into question the opponent’s total
Weltanschauung…’; third, the total conception refers to the theoretical or noological
level; fourth, ‘the total conception uses a more formal functional analysis …[It]
presupposes simply that there is a correspondence between a given social situation
and a given perspective…’6. Accordingly this conception of ideology refers to the
subject, even if it’s individual or not, claiming that the subject’s knowledge is
determined by its social existence.7
Now, it is obvious that Mannheim adverted foremost to the importance of the
total conception of ideology in the development of his sociology of knowledge. In
the chapter on their historical perspective he concludes that the world of enlight-
enment created a new world existing only in reference to the subject. But if an
investigator wants to see how this reference functions he need to look at himself as
just another subject of this reference. And this is the root of Mannheim’s relativism:
a relativist state of the subject who cannot avoid the individualisation of the modern,
but, at the same time, has no chance to stay alone with his thoughts. Almost nobody
has any chance to separate ties and social bonds, but, as we will see, only almost.
From what follows, I think, it will be obvious that it was very important to
reconsider these elements of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge so as to conceive
what Mannheim calls relationism. To step forward let us pay some attention to the
problem of ‘false consciousness’. This notion has presumably originated in the
modern critique of religious thinking of the Middle Ages. Most followers of the
Enlightenment used this concept to demonstrate how religious thinkers misunder-
stood the meaning of truth in the world. Now, in its modern type, this became a
4Karl MANNHEIM (1985)
5K. M. ibid. p. 56.
6K. M. ibid. pp. 56–58.
7See also K. M. ibid. pp. 266–286.
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central element of ‘a methodical procedure resting upon scientific demonstration’8 .
And this procedure is the relationism itself. The denial of the truth of conscious
is not simply a statement anymore but a serious critique claiming strict demon-
stration. And when we begin to apply this method to our own thinking then we
are very close to think reflexively. Reflexive thinking emerges as a consequence of
the age of uncertainty and doubtfulness, the only fruitful historical viewpoint and,
last but not least, the most essential method used by the free-floating intellectuals
(freischwebende Intelligenz). This is the method of re-questioning the world, and
of what was seen as a matter-of-course part of it. As Mannheim writes: ‘…the
general form of the total conception of ideology is being used by the analyst he has
the courage to subject not just the adversary’s point but all points of view, includ-
ing his own, to the ideological analysis’9. The analyst of society naturally needs
a scientific method to do his job and he himself is the only person who can elab-
orate this methodology. Additionally his scientific and social position requires a
relativist method. He evidently chooses relativism making it stronger by the social
perspective. From this point the philosophical relativism became sociological one,
the pure relativism became historical and methodological one. This is the birth of
relationism.
It is Gregory Baum who is an early investigator of Mannheim’s critic against
pure relativism. As he writes: ‘Relativism, in the eye of Scheler and Mannheim,
was a dangerous human attitude that would eventually turn into scepticism and its
product, social apathy.’10 But Mannheim did not want to see the building of social
institutions to be ruined. He wanted something else: a new methodology for more
sophisticated social investigations.
I have already emphasized that the sociology of knowledge is rooted in the
simple theory of ideology, and it attempts to discover the ‘situational determination’
(Seinsgebundenheit) of all forms of thinking. This results in a new kind of history
of ideas that owns the ability to investigate historical cases from a radically new
point of view. Thus the sociology of knowledge is either new for the disciplines of
the social sciences and philosophy or for the historiography itself.11 It also shows
that this kind of relativism has already broken the traditional walls of philosophical
relativism.
We have two solutions to the problem of what constitutes reliable knowledge:
relationism and relativism. As we will see we must never confuse them. Accord-
ing to Mannheim, ‘[r]elativism is a product of the modern historical-sociological
procedure which is based on the recognition that all historical thinking is bound
up with the concrete position in life of the thinker’12. But this concept is still con-
nected to an old type of epistemology ‘which was as yet unaware of the interplay
8K. M. ibid. p. 70.
9K. M. ibid. p. 77.
10Gregory BAUM (1997) p. 27.
11For a detailed description of its historiographical character, see Helge KRAGH (1991 [1987])
pp. 58–60.
12K. M. ibid. pp. 78–79.
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between conditions of existence and modes of thought, and which modelled its
knowledge after static prototypes such as might be exemplified by the proposition
2 × 2 = 4’13. Thus, by the help of this epistemology, one can merely reject every
knowledge oriented to social situation as ‘relative’.
So we will need a new epistemology to overcome this unfruitful situation. One
must sooner or later realize that there is no absolute truth and knowing mechanism
existing independently of the values and social contexts. Let us now consider the
two types of the conception of ideology. (None of them belongs evidently to the
relativism or to the relationism.) The first is the non-evaluative one: this historical
view-point essentially leads to relationism. ‘Relationism signifies merely that all
of the elements of meaning in a given situation have reference to one another and
derive their significance from this reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame of
thought …We have, then, as the theme of this non-evaluative study of ideology, the
relationship of all partial knowledge and its component elements to the larger body
of meaning, and ultimately to the structure of historical reality’.14
The earlier non-evaluative conception of ideology finally results in an evalu-
ative conception. Evaluation is not a mistake, says Mannheim, we need to exceed
somehow. Simple philosophical relativism keeps itself away from evaluation. This
intention, however, mustn’t satisfy the sociologists. They want just to evaluate the
society and the socially determined knowledge of its members. This objective re-
sults in an evaluative epistemology and in an ontological-metaphysical approach.
And it is very important because ‘empirical procedure (in the historical sciences,
at least) can be carried on only on the basis of certain meta-empirical, ontological,
and metaphysical judgements and the expectations and hypotheses that follow from
them’15. It is clear that the current sociology of scientific knowledge (and the new
history of science) runs its investigations in right this spirit. Mannheim’s most im-
portant advice is to express the hidden elements in our conscious, and not to hide
what is otherwise conspicuous.
Finishing this detailed description of Mannheim’s conception of ideology let
us now summarize what he meant by relativism. Mannheim was struggling with
the critics of relativism, he had to elaborate a new kind of relativism that defends
the whole concept of the sociology of knowledge. He tried to exceed philosophical
relativism that means a non-sociological, non-reflexive, non-methodological and
accordingly non-evaluative relativism. It shows something but could not uncover
the existential, social and cultural roots of knowledge. We must be careful to avoid
this standpoint.
To adopt the right point of view is to apply the method of dynamic relation-
ism. Instead of the pure, insignificant relativism, he moved toward the application
of relationism: Mannheim added a sociological perspective to the pure cultural-
philosophical one. He puts the analyst into the centre of his relativist conception and
13Ibid. p. 79.
14Ibid. pp. 86–87.
15Ibid. p. 89.; The English version of the text uses the term ‘social sciences’ instead of ‘historischen
Wissenschaften’ as the German original does.
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he puts him there as well in his later works on social reconstruction. The relativist
himself is a real person who acknowledges the importance of a new epistemology.
Only the free-floating intellectuals own the ability to separate what is ideological
and what is not. They are not bound to any class but have common values and the
same cultural background that keeps them together. They are not above any class
but exist for the whole society to care for its culture. They have the great task to
provide their own societies with an acceptable analysis.
Mannheim would like to avoid the so called ‘sterile form of relativism’ that is
disregarding the sociological factors conditioning every product of thought. On the
contrary, the sociology of knowledge, overcoming the mere application of theory of
ideology, makes the existential determination of knowledge the only methodology
for social and historical sciences. The relativist is a special actor in this world who
applies the chosen relationist methodology (MR) and owns a new epistemology to
evaluate historical and social knowledge (KR) resting in a free-floating position and
thinking as reflexively as it is possible (OR).
According to Mannheim, there is no place for the sociology of knowledge
in the history of exact sciences. We can talk about an earlier and a later period
of knowledge in this case. Only the history of moral sciences [die Geschichte
der Geisteswissenschaften – P. F.] is problematic because ‘earlier stages are not
quite simple superseded by the later stages’16. The knowledge set of the natural
sciences evolves gradually, but that of the cultural sciences changes and develops
in another way. 2 + 2 = 4 presents no clue as to when, where, by whom and
why it was formulated, but the theories of social sciences mirror e. g. the schools
affected them. ‘In assertion of this sort, we may speak of an >infiltration of a social
position< of the investigator into the results of his study and of the >situational
relativity< (Situationgebundenheit), or the relationship of these assertions to the
underlying reality’17.
The relational procedure can be well characterized with the case of the ur-
banized peasant boy. For the boy who was grown up as a peasant in a village, its
culture is taken for granted. But the boy who left for the city can change his point
of view and he ceases to see this rural mode of living and thinking taken for granted
from a wider perspective. In a given group, something (e.g. a way of thinking) can
be seen as absolute but out of that group (from another group) the same thing will
be recognized as partial. The former peasant boy does not simply reflect the ways
of thinking in his village as a ‘homogeneous participant’. ‘Rather he relates them
to a certain mode of interpreting the world which, in turn, is ultimately related to a
certain social structure which constitutes its situation’18. ‘[C]ertain mode of inter-
preting the world’ means, in this case, an urban mode of thinking and the society in
the background. The sociology of knowledge presents more than simple relativism
in the systematic and conscious questioning of all intellectual phenomena. It is not
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definition is that ‘[r]elationism does not signify that there are no criteria of rightness
and wrongness in a discussion. It does insist, however, that it lies in the nature of
certain assertions that they cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of the
perspective of a given situation’19. Until this time the difference between relativism
and relationism remained hidden for most scholars. Now that the differences have
been made clear let us see what changes occurred in the later history of relativism.
3. Back to Mannheim?
In the 1970s the strong programme of the sociology of knowledge appeared in Great
Britain. There are two points that made the sociology of knowledge stronger. The
first is the symmetry thesis which says that the same kind of cause would explain
true and false beliefs too.20 Mannheim’s theory suffers from the lack of this thesis
because the other three theses (causality, impartiality, and reflexivity) can be found
more or less in Mannheim’s writings. Reflexivity is explicit, impartiality is apparent
in the concept of the free-floating intellectual, and causality can be understood as
the base of relationism.
The second point that makes this programme stronger is the acceptance of
mathematical objects as social constructions. ‘Mathematics and logic are collec-
tions of norms. The ontological status of logic and mathematics is the same as
that of an institution. They are social in nature’21 – asserts Bloor. Members of the
strong programme have chosen beliefs of scientists as the only aim of their inves-
tigations but, at the same time, disregard everyday knowledge from their interests.
Hereby a brand new discipline, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) has
been established. Thus for the first sight it must be a relationist conception as well
as Mannheim’s own theory. Then why does not Bloor use this term? Is he a real
relativist at all? A deep investigation is still needed to answer these questions.
In 1976, Bloor was still a perfect relativist (as Mannheim would say: rela-
tionist).22 He wrote as follows: ‘There is no denying that the strong programme in
the sociology of knowledge rests on a form of relativism. It adopts what may be
called ‘methodological relativism’, a position summarized in the symmetry and re-
flexivity requirements…’.23 It is obvious that Bloor accepts all forms of relativism:
KR, OR, and MR too. For Bloor, KR means that there is nothing like knowledge in
the world, there are only beliefs.24 OR means reflexive approach of an independent
relativist as for Mannheim.25 And MR is nothing else but a simple relationist pro-
19Ibid. p. 283.
20David BLOOR (1976) p. 5.
21David BLOOR (1973) p.189.
22From this point I use the world relativism instead of relationism to speak the same language with
the contemporary authors but, meanwhile, I still think of relationism.
23D. B. (1976) pp. 142–143.
24See ibid. p. 2.
25See ibid. p. 5. (The fourth tenet of strong programme.)
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gramme strengthened with the symmetry thesis, and the anti-Platonist world-view
that means anti-realism in this case.26 And this whole approach has been applied to
the history of natural sciences. These features perfectly summarize the early state
and endeavour of SSK.27
In 1982, David Bloor and Barry Barnes published a study concerning the
problem of relativism.28 Their primary goal is to present a relativist interpretation
of their own. Three basic characteristics of relativism are determined: the first is
that investigations of a given object result in different observations (OK); the second
is that the appearance of a belief in a milieu depends on the circumstances of its
agents (KR); and the third one is the symmetry thesis as I have already mentioned,
and they add that in the case of all beliefs ‘regardless of truth or falsity the fact of
their credibility is equally problematic’ (MR).29 Barnes and Bloor couldn’t even
conceal the eager relativism still streaming out from their writing. In the whole
study, they are trying to defend this whole-heartedly accepted point of view against
some rationalist philosophers such as Popper, Lakatos, Hollis and Lukes.30
From the middle of the 1990s David Bloor seems to admit realism but not the
Platonic one he condemned before.31 In his early writings, Bloor talks about the
rejection of Realism. This realism means that there is something like a very abstract,
very general, and very rigid truth in the world: namely, the world of Platonist math-
ematical objects are parts and bearers of the eternal truth. Bloor rejected this theory
arguing that mathematical objects are just the same social constructions as all the
other scientific (and non-scientific) theories in the world. For short, mathematical
knowledge owns the same characteristics as the other forms of knowledge. They
are social in nature: they are beliefs about the world. Let us now see if he changed
his point of view in his later period, or not.
From 1996, Bloor writes about a so called realist strategy that helps people
to “evaluate perceptions and observations, to select some as ‘good data’ indicative
of ‘how things really are’, and to reject or formulate the rest as in some way flawed
26See ibid. p. 5. (The third tenet of strong programme.) and D. B.,Wittgenstein and Mannheim on
the Sociology of Mathematics, p. 176.
27Additionally Bloor also accepts moral relativism: ‘There need be no such thing as Truth, other
than conjectural, relative truth, any more than there need be absolute moral standards rather than
locally accepted ones. If we can live with moral relativism we can live with absolute cognitive
relativism.’ D. B. ibid. p. 143.
28David BLOOR – Barry BARNES (1982)
29Ibid. p. 23.
30Philip PETTIT accused the members of the strong programme with, as he writes, a conservative
attitude when they don’t evaluate beliefs. He wants to liberate the SSK from harmful relativism.
(See. P. P., The Strong Sociology of Knowledge without Relativism, in: R. N. ibid., pp. 81–91.)
Unfortunately he couldn’t realize that one cannot be a sociologist of knowledge without being a
relativist. A so called value-free attitude may be the most important thesis of the sociology since
Max Weber. One stops being a sociologist when begins to evaluate beliefs instead of explaining and
trying to understand their social character. Pettit’s suggestion was a complete misunderstanding of
the project.
31Barry BARNES – David BLOOR – John HENRY (1996) pp. 81–88.
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or misleading”32. Scientists serve as the best example because they are perfectly
able to grab the contrast between ‘real’ and ‘unreal’, or ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’.
They are the perfect appliers of this realist strategy: ‘[w]hat many eyes or many
instruments agree on will be an observation of what is really there; what just one
eye or one instrument observes, in contradiction to others, will be artefactual. Or
at least this will be the usual realist strategy.’33 We live in a world of objects we
believe in, but objects are ‘out there’, independently of our belief. Realist strategist
perceives a world constituted of objects he believes to exist within it, and this belief
is getting deeper as it is strengthened by the similar observations and beliefs of other
strategists. Scientist is such a strategist as well: he uses such beliefs to assort and
reconstruct his data. Bloor says that scientists apply the same strategy as anybody
else in everyday life. But I think Bloor unwittingly suggests something else.
All the scientists are realists in one way or another, says Bloor, and, conse-
quently, the sociologist is probably one of them. Social scientists must act by the
same common-sense realist strategy too. But social scientists get back to a special
position with this conception. This position seems to be a return to Mannheim’s
conception on the free-floating intellectuals. The intellectuals, the carriers and
guards of knowledge, are the special strategists of the society whose task is to help
people to evaluate the world existing independently of them. They own a feature
that makes them to be capable of playing this mediator role. The feature means
some kind of independency and it does not really matter if it is concerned with their
free existential state (Mannheim) or with a special ability to rule and control knowl-
edge (Bloor). Of course, sociologists use a common realist strategy (methodology)
but they have the only systematized and official knowledge to explain the world
and to draw attention to the relationship between reality and beliefs. He obviously
shows this group of intellectuals as who more or less own a privileged position to
affect what is known in the world. It’s not a free-floating position but undeniably a
privileged one.
Bloor seems to separate the ‘unreality’ of numbers as creations of our collec-
tive mind from ‘real’ objects and artefacts. But why? Is there any real difference
between these entities from a sociological point of view? The main difference is,
asserts Bloor, that numbers are creation of the social mind (social constructions),
not like everyday objects and artefacts that are given into our world by Nature in-
dependently of any social formation. I think Bloor stepped back in his defending
of his strong programme.34
Nothing really changed, of course, there is no difference between them from
a sociological point of view because natural and mathematical objects are the same
concerning our beliefs on them. To contribute to the explanation of the problem of
32Ibid. p. 81.
33Ibid. p. 82.
34This is what Latour claims using the strong theses of the social constructivist tradition (STS).
Latour esteems himself a realist thinker. He perfectly renewed the classical realist point of view but
fell again in the gap of an other kind of relativism. Here I cannot detail this problem. See. Bruno
LATOUR (1999) p. 120.
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realism, Bloor points to the process of reification. ‘To reify, it is alleged, is to lose
sensitivity to the rich complexity of appearances, and to cease transformation, and
to impose a hypostatised representation on a cosmos in flux; it is to set limits on
the extent of our awareness and to impoverish our imagination; it puts groundless
constraints upon what we believe to be possible and thereby upon what we will
attempt to bring about.’35 We need a realist strategy to orient us in the world.
We cannot live and understand each other without a realist mode of speech. This
mode helps the scientist in the creation of their own sacralized objects. The pure
essentialism turns into scientific sacralization: emerging as a defending reaction
of scientists themselves. This is the importance of the realist point of view in
the sociology of science. Those sociologists, says Bloor, who oppose realism
deconstruct “scientific discourse and show how its theoretical entities are human
inventions, rather than revelations of ‘what is really there’”36. But Bloor accepts a
naive, common-sense realism asserting that “[w]hat we generally do in everyday life
is to contrast theory and indeed speech generally with reality ‘itself’, unverbalized
reality, whatever is ‘out there’ independent of perception, thought and word”37.
Consequently, he does not oppose his early rejection of Realism because
this anti-Realism only widens the range of social constructions with mathematical
objects arguing that these are only beliefs about the world. A realist strategy,
however, is related to the everyday practice of (scientific) knower whose findings
are controlled by this strategy. This is only a base for a better scientific orientation.
The ultimate aim of the scientist is to present with the best estimation of the ‘real
melting-point’. Bloor’s anti-Realism is a metaphysical standpoint of his own, but
this realist strategy is a conception attributed to all scientists. Scientists simply
think that theoretical entities like atoms and molecules are responsible for their
observations and findings. They treat these theoretical entities as is commonly
done in everyday life, they take them for granted. So one cannot charge Bloor with
the loss of KR, OR, or MR, realist strategy is, as we have just seen, something else.
4. How about this Relativism?
In 1999, Bruno Latour charged Bloor with being a relationist (relative relativist)
but he hardly explains what he exactly meant by that.38 Latour seeks to distance
himself from relativism. He consistently treats relativism as a contrast to realism.
Bloor answers that he doesn’t contrast relativism to realism (thinking of objects
as realities) but to absolutism (thinking of a sort of knowledge as the only truth).
Nature plays a central role in the formation of beliefs – says Bloor. Relativists
are not defence lawyers, as Latour says, but philosophers of law who argue that
“there are no absolute standards of justice, or no absolute ‘rights’ against which
35D. B. ibid. p. 84.
36Ibid. p. 87.
37Ibid. pp. 87–88.
38B. L. (1999) p. 120.
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legislation may be assessed”39. Relativism doesn’t mean that all beliefs are equally
credible, repeats Bloor, it means that all beliefs have the right to face the problem
of credibility.
Latour’s answer is that he has no difficulty in accepting Bloor’s relativism as
being the opposite of absolutism. His criticism is only against relative relativism (or
relationism) ‘that sticks to the empirical task of tracing the establishment of rela-
tions’40. But, unfortunately, his argumentation stops at this point. Only the charge
of absolutism appears in his writing again. Latour charges Bloor with accepting an
absolutist position when he insists on keeping the difference between nature and
society.41 This distinction, consequently, equals relationism, and this relationism
seems to be the same that Mannheim supported.
Bloor asserts that relativism is a fight against naturalisation: it means to teach
scientists to say that they are having an interpretation of nature instead of saying that
they know what nature is. But Latour esteems this effort as completely fruitless. He
says that let us get rid of this useless relativism that is, as he makes it more precise,
a relative relativism or, as Mannheim calls it, relationism, and he suggests to choose
us another way (namely the STS) to rethink and rewrite the notion of ‘nature’.42
The notion of relationism had been forgotten for a long time, however, its
content lived on in the notion of relativism (that was, of course, not the same as
philosophical relativism). But the theory of relationism survived the changes of
sociology and recent researches still hang on to it. Mannheim construed sociolog-
ical relativism (relationism), Bloor applied it, under the name of relativism, to his
investigations of natural sciences. Latour is eager to exceed relationism but it is
still a serious question if he manages to do it.
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